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Abstract. Existing theoretical universal algorithmic intelligence models are not 
practically realizable. More pragmatic approach to artificial general intelligence 
is based on cognitive architectures, which are, however, non-universal in sense 
that they can construct and use models of the environment only from Turing-
incomplete model spaces. We believe that the way to the real AGI consists in 
bridging the gap between these two approaches. This is possible if one consid-
ers cognitive functions as a “cognitive bias” (priors and search heuristics) that 
should be incorporated into the models of universal algorithmic intelligence 
without violating their universality. Earlier reported results suiting this ap-
proach and its overall feasibility are discussed on the example of perception, 
planning, knowledge representation, attention, theory of mind, language, and 
some others. 
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1 Introduction 
In Searle’s definition, weak AI is distinguished from strong AI (SAI), which can think 
in exactly the same sense as human beings think. Notion “human-level AI” is also 
frequently used now. Both these notions are very anthropomorphic and rather vague, 
because they refer to the poorly apprehensible phenomenon. Clearer distinction is 
between specialized and general intelligence without references to human intelli-
gence. 
In this context it is somewhat surprising that the mainstream approach to the artifi-
cial general intelligence (AGI) is based on cognitive architectures [1], most of which 
try to mimic different aspects of human intelligence starting from the lowest levels in 
the case of emergent architectures and ending with the high-level cognitive functions 
in the case of symbolic architectures. 
Motivation for cognitive architectures is also clearly explained referring to the hu-
man brain: “Different parts of the brain carry out various functions, and no one part is 
particularly intelligent on its own, but working in concert within the right architecture 
they result in human-level intelligence… On the other hand, most of the work in the 
AI field today is far less integrative than what we see in the brain.” [2] 
 Of course, integrative investigations are very useful. But are they aimed at AGI or 
SAI? Of course, some AI systems can be both strong (human-like) and general. But 
there are apparent methodological differences between these two approaches. 
Possibility of achieving AGI via cognitive architectures is supported by the opin-
ion: “As a result, no one knows what level of intelligence could be achieved by taking 
an appropriate assemblage of cutting-edge AI algorithms and appropriately integrat-
ing them together in a unified framework, in which they can each contribute their 
respective strengths toward achieving the goals of an overall intelligent system.” [2] 
However, some doubts can be expressed, because fundamental problems still re-
main in subareas of AI, and these problems cannot be solved only by integration. It 
can be seen on the example of machine learning. Existing practical algorithms are still 
non-universal as being compared with Solomonoff induction [3]. Each algorithm 
works in Turing-incomplete model space, and cannot extract arbitrary regularity from 
data. Thus, any system built on the base of such algorithms will be limited in the rep-
resentable concepts. In some sense, these systems can only do what they are pro-
grammed to do. 
The following analogy can be used. It was the mathematical model of universal 
machine with ability to execute arbitrary algorithm or to emulate any other special-
ized machine that enabled creation of computers. Before this, each automaton implic-
itly embodied a single particular algorithm and was non-universal in this sense. Uni-
versal artificial intelligence should relate to the present cognitive architectures in the 
same way as computers relate to automata of previous centuries. 
Thus, we claim that no combination of non-universal (weak) cognitive functions 
will result in universal (strong) intelligence. Such combinations will bring yet other 
(weak) cognitive architectures. It is not bad to refer to the organization of the human 
brain, but it is simply not enough (for example, the question about “algorithms of the 
brain” even could not be put before the mathematical theory of algorithms and the 
universal machine were discovered). This organization should be described in math-
ematical terms relevant to the universal intelligence.  
Models of universal algorithmic artificial (UAI) intelligence do exist [4, 5]. Re-
markably, they have almost nothing in common with the cognitive architectures. 
However, these models are not constructive (they require infinite, or practically infi-
nite computational resources). 
Unsurprisingly, these models are criticized for their impracticality, because they 
don’t satisfy the notion of efficient intelligence given in [6] (or of efficient pragmatic 
general intelligence [7]). Indeed, it is very easy e.g. to play chess possessing infinite 
computational resources. However, brute force algorithms are not smart in some intui-
tive sense, although they solve the intellectual task. Thus, it is useful to make distinc-
tion between efficient intelligence and mere (inefficient) intelligence. Of course, effi-
cient intelligence is of interest, but the main contribution of the UAI models is their 
universality. 
Of course, the UAI models will be only a small step forward while they remain in-
efficient. At the same time, most cognitive architectures are as non-universal as the 
universal models are inefficient. They are situated on the opposite ends of the interval 
(efficient, non-universal) – (universal, inefficient). Necessity to combine efficiency 
of cognitive architecture and universality of the UAI models is obvious. However, 
“the general mathematical theory of AGI, though it has inspired some practical work, 
has not yet been connected with complex AGI architectures in any nontrivial way” 
[8]. We believe that this connection is necessary in the first place. 
One can either try to introduce universality into the cognitive architectures or to 
make models of UAI efficient. In this paper, we consider the second way, but the first 
way is also possible. Cognitive functions are interpreted as metaheuristics and prior 
information, which make universal intelligence efficient and pragmatic relative to our 
world. 
In several following papers, we give a draft on how one can mathematically intro-
duce such metaheuristics as representations and uncertainty into the models of 
universal algorithmic intelligence. All other components of cognitive architectures 
can be and should be incorporated into these models with minimum losses of 
universality, but with maximum improvements of efficiency. In this paper, we discuss 
feasibility of formalization of cognitive functions as metaheuristics increasing 
efficiency of UAI. 
2 Ideal Minimal Intelligence 
The mentioned Solomonoff universal induction can be rather naturally extended to the 
models of universal algorithmic agents. AIXI is the most well known models thanks 
to the detailed analysis of its universality and loss bounds [4]. Its time-restricted ver-
sion is called AIXItl, which obvious drawback is inefficiency (optimality up to some 
constant slowdown factor [9]). 
Some additional doubts can be expressed concerning completeness of this model. 
Imagine two AIXItl agents playing rock-scissor-paper game many times. The agent 
with higher computational resources will definitely be winning. However, very simple 
agent making purely random choices can secure draw in average. Environment is 
always more complex and has more computational resources, and randomness in 
action choices can be crucial. This is not modeled in AIXI. In addition, prior and in-
variable value function can be considered as a decrease of universality. 
It was pointed out [9] that constant slowdown can be eliminated by self-
optimization, and the Gödel machine with such self-optimization was proposed. Self-
optimization is indeed the essential part of the universal intelligent agent. However, 
the Gödel machine performs self-optimization, only when it can formally prove that 
this will result in increase of future rewards. But inductive nature of agent’s decision-
making implies that such proofs can be given only in the very limited number of 
cases. Probably, a theory of more “soft” self-optimization should be developed. 
It can be seen that there are some issues in the existing models of universal agents 
to be solved. We will refer to some imaginary model with the solved issues as Ideal 
Minimal Intelligence (IMI) in order to avoid discussion if some concrete model is 
absolutely satisfactory or not. 
The IMI-agent has minimum bias towards some specific environment, where it can 
be inefficient. But this agent performs self-optimization and given enough experience 
and time can become efficient pragmatic general intelligence meaning that it will be 
 able to achieve goals in this environment optimally using computational resources. 
However, it should be pointed out that even if IMI-agents are asymptotically optimal 
without any multiplicative and additive slowdown factors, it is not enough, because 
they will require executing too many real-world actions (not just computational opera-
tions) in order to acquire information necessary for self-optimization. Probably, the 
IMI-agent will be required to repeat the whole evolution, which also can be consid-
ered as the efficiently self-optimizing search. 
Creating real AGI implies that we must essentially accelerate this process. Differ-
ences between pragmatic intelligence comprised by many cognitive functions and the 
simple IMI are entirely conditioned by properties of the real-world environment. This 
“cognitive bias” contains both prior information for inductive inference and predic-
tion, and heuristics for search procedures. This is a huge bias [10], under which the 
small IMI core can be almost invisible. However, significance of IMI consists in ne-
cessity to introduce this cognitive bias without violating universality. The most direct 
way to do this is to strictly describe the specific cognitive functions as heuristics ex-
tending some IMI model. In the rest part of the paper, we discuss if this approach can 
be adequately realized. 
3 Cognitive Bias 
It can be argued that the universal intelligence agents can in principle reproduce most 
forms of human behavior [4] such as supervised learning, board game playing, etc., 
though the agents are not designed to these specific tasks. Probably, some phenomena 
such as self-consciousness are not reproduced by these agents and require some addi-
tional self-referential structures. However, these issues need separate discussion. Fur-
ther, we show that cognitive functions don’t extend capabilities of IMI-agents, but 
increase their efficiency in terms of computational resources and learning rates. Sev-
eral cognitive functions are considered, but this analysis can be extended on the most 
of them. 
 
Perception 
IMI models don’t include such separate cognitive function as perception. At the same 
time, natural perception systems are strongly biased towards typical regularities en-
countered in the real world. This bias is realized in the form of specific information 
representations and allows for very efficient interpretation of sensory data without 
exhaustive search. 
On the example of perception it is definitely clear that IMI models requiring direct 
search for algorithmic models of e.g. images with lengths exceeding millions bits (e.g. 
>>10100000 alternatives) are absolutely unrealistic. At the same time, it can be noted 
that natural perceptual systems retain universality. They can learn stimuli with almost 
arbitrary regularities. And it is always very easy to find stimuli classes, which cannot 
be learned by machine perception systems relying on the restricted representations. In 
spite of considerable progress in the fields of robotics, artificial intelligence, machine 
perception and learning, there is a lack of truly cognitive systems that possess enough 
generality to deal with unstructured environment [11]. This is why perception systems 
cannot be implemented as self-contained specialized modules. 
The question is how to make the process of model construction (i.e. perception) by 
IMI more efficient. In a following paper we will describe how one can introduce in 
IMI such metaheuristic as representation. Representation is the main part of the Rep-
resentational Minimum Description Length (RMDL) principle, which was developed 
in attempt to bridge the gap between theoretically ideal universal induction and prac-
tical applications of the information-theoretic criteria in computer vision [12]. This 
principle is derived from the necessity to decompose the task of model construction 
for the complete sensory history into almost independent subtasks. Because the 
summed complexity of models constructed in the subtasks is much larger than the 
complexity of the holistic model constructed for the entire history, direct decomposi-
tion is inadmissible. However, if one extracts mutual information from data fragments 
being independently described and uses this mutual information as prior information 
for subtasks, summed conditional complexity of models for data fragments can be 
much closer to the complexity of the holistic model. This mutual information can be 
treated as a representation. 
Hierarchical decompositions are more efficient. Such representations are rather 
common in machine perception methods. But they are usually introduced heuristi-
cally. Moreover, intensive hierarchical decomposition leads to decrease of quality of 
the models constructed within these representations. Suppression of this drawback can 
be performed by introducing adaptive resonance that can also be incorporated into 
information-theoretic induction [13]. Additionally, Solomonoff induction requires 
practically impossible summation over infinite number of models. Reduction of the 
algorithmic probability to the finite (typically small) number of models is the un-
avoidable heuristic. However, one should not simply reduce the number of models, 
but should introduce uncertain models, which contain simplified information about 
other possible models. Some mathematical details will be given in another paper. 
One can also claim that investigation of particular representations should be guided 
by criteria derived from the universal induction meaning that researchers also perform 
optimization in fashion of universal induction. And automatic construction of repre-
sentations can be considered as an element of self-optimization of IMI. 
The RMDL principle is the distinct example of the possible extension of IMI mod-
els with the almost unavoidable heuristic of induction task decomposition. We believe 
that bridging the gap between the other cognitive functions and IMI models in the 
similar way is the straightest way to AGI. 
 
Planning 
The notion of representation was formally introduced in the framework of Solomon-
off induction to decompose the model construction process. However, the task of 
sequential decision making also has extremely large computational complexity. The 
human brain uses some cognitive functions, which can be considered as search meta-
heuristics. The most obvious one is planning. 
 Brute force algorithms don’t use planning. Interestingly, modern chess-playing 
programs also don’t use planning, while human players almost obligatory rely on a 
plan while developing their game [14]. 
One of the origins of planning consists in the possibility to reuse results of search 
performed on the previous steps. Indeed, plans are built in advance, and then they are 
only adjusted implying that the search tree is not constructed from scratch in each 
moment of time. This strategy can be easily incorporated into IMI models, but natural 
planning is much more sophisticated. 
Humans construct plans and perform search in terms of some generalized actions. 
More distant plans are, more abstract actions are involved. Usage of generalized ac-
tions is an obvious heuristic. These actions also form a kind of representation, but it 
cannot be directly put in the universal induction framework. In practice, such repre-
sentations are specified a priori, and particular planning algorithms are developed for 
them. This is insufficient for AGI. 
On the one hand, search and optimization research areas including heuristic pro-
gramming, simulated annealing, genetic algorithms, and other fields are rather devel-
oped in the classical AI. On the other hand, there is still no general solution of the 
search problem. Most likely, there cannot be such solution except some universal self-
optimization, because different heuristics and specific search methods suit better for 
different tasks. 
At present, there is no theory of efficient pragmatic general self-optimization capa-
ble of invention of arbitrary search heuristics. However, this search (even being 
given) should also be speeded up using some very general metaheuristics. Otherwise 
it will not be pragmatic. 
 
Knowledge 
Knowledge plays the prominent role in human intelligence. At the same time, there is 
no knowledge representation in IMI, which constructs holistic models of its history 
without explicitly extracting knowledge from them. Actually, knowledge is some-
times considered simply as the highest level in the hierarchical models of perception 
and control (e.g. knowledge level of a vision system). In this context, not much can be 
added to the ideas discussed in the sections devoted to perception and planning. How-
ever, knowledge representations are also conditioned by social interactions, which 
will be discussed later. 
In general, knowledge representations can probably be discovered during self-
optimization of IMI, but this process requires extremely long-term interactions. Use-
ful representations of the world abstracted from specific modalities can additionally 
bootstrap transformation of IMI into pragmatic efficient AGI. But, again, these repre-
sentations shouldn’t restrict universality of IMI. 
 
Memory 
Memory is one of the main components of the most cognitive architectures. At the 
same time, IMI models start with storing raw history while human memory has very 
elaborated structure. It was already pointed out [7] that memory (as the cognitive 
function) is absent in the models of universal intelligence due to supposed unlimited 
resources, but memory is the essential element of developing these models into effi-
cient pragmatic general intelligence. 
Apparently, it is too wasteful to build models of environment at each time moment. 
These models can be stored and retrieved, when necessary. Structure of memory par-
tially originates from structure of models. For example, semantic and episodic memo-
ries probably correspond to stored representations and models of the specific data 
described within these representations. Chunks and transfer learning can also be ex-
plained in terms of induction task decomposition. 
Memory is tightly connected with perception, representations, planning and so on. 
But it also adds the aspect of incremental learning. Both retrieval and adjustment of 
models stored in memory should be formally introduced into IMI models to increase 
their efficiency without violating universality. And, of course, implementations of 
memory in cognitive architectures cannot be universal, if they rely on non-universal 
induction. 
 
Attention 
Attention is the diverse phenomenon. However, its origin in management of limited 
resources is evident. For example, visual attention is aimed at the most informative or 
significant (in terms of value functions) part of a scene meaning that this part is thor-
oughly analyzed using more resources than those allocated for other parts. Of course, 
allocation of resources while solving other cognitive tasks also can be considered as 
attention. 
There are different models of attention for cognitive architecture (e.g. [15, 16]). 
Even simple universal solvers (e.g. [17]), which take computational complexity into 
account, try to optimally allocate resources among different hypothesis under consid-
eration. Apparently, more elaborated attention mechanisms should be presented in the 
efficient pragmatic AGI. However, details of these mechanisms greatly depend on 
other parts of a cognitive architecture. Thus, the substantive model of attention should 
be developed jointly with the resource-limited extension of IMI models. 
 
Motivation 
One of the difficult questions for the theories of universal intelligence is the question 
about motivation. As it was mentioned, assumption of the invariable value function 
given a priori is restrictive. Imagine that the agent has a “simple” goal – to survive. 
What value function should be used? The direct “survival” value function will have 
only two values corresponding to the states “alive” and “dead”. Such the value func-
tion can be optimized only by evolution of many agents, because single agent without 
some specific prior knowledge is unable to predict the “dead” state, which has not 
been ever encountered. 
More complex value functions are survival heuristics. Pain tells us that we are 
coming nearer to the “dead” state. Pleasure tells us that we are moving away from it. 
But these prior heuristics are not intelligent and lead to mistakes, when we need to 
overcome pain or to avoid pleasure to stay alive, and this only can be done thanks to 
the abstract fear of death. It is very difficult to specify a good value function prior to 
intelligence. 
 Not only pain and pleasure, but also different emotions can be considered as addi-
tional survival heuristics. They help intelligence to learn good survival strategies 
quicker. For example, the intelligent agent without particularly design curiosity may 
learn knowledge-seeking strategy, if it helps to survive. But this agent at least should 
remain alive until this strategy is learned. Apparently, curiosity factor can be included 
a priori into the value function as the survival heuristic. And the theory of how to 
formally describe curiosity or creativity or aesthetic reward already exists [18]. 
But even if we include some survival heuristics, the agent will still be motivated 
not to survive, but to maximize the given value function. In contrast, the natural intel-
ligence is not the system of maximization of the given value function, but it is the one 
large survival heuristic. It is probably not so bad to be curious by itself [19], but the 
problem is to specify such value functions that the agent’s behavior will correspond to 
our expectations. This problem is discussed in more details on the example of safe or 
friendly AGI [20]. Indeed, one cannot precisely specify friendliness (as well as sur-
vival) a priori as a value function external to the unbiased intelligence. Thus, the AGI 
should be very biased a priori or should learn better value functions during life-time. 
However, investigations of the problem of learning the value functions by universal 
algorithmic agents have started only recently (e.g. [21]). 
 
Social interactions 
Interactions with other intelligent agents constitute very significant part of the envi-
ronment. These agents are very complex, so the inductive reconstruction of the ap-
propriate models of other agents will require very long-term interactions in the real 
world and vast computational resources. Apparently, some theory of mind should be 
incorporated into efficient pragmatic general intelligence. But it should be added as an 
element of the bias that shifts universal priors, but doesn’t restrict the model space. 
Social interactions are not reduced only to predicting behavior (or reconstructing 
models) of other agents as the part of environment. Of course, social agents interact 
also via the interface of sensory inputs and actuating outputs, but they can communi-
cate fragments of models of environment, behavior policies, and even value functions. 
It is actually society that accumulates complex value functions, inductive bias and 
search heuristics (in the form of ethics, science, etc.) thanks to sharing information 
and computational resources between agents. Unbiased universal agents can learn to 
acquire this information from society given enough time (however, it may not be true 
for value functions). But efficient pragmatic general intelligence should have this 
ability a priori meaning that it is biased towards social environments [22] or has com-
munication prior [23]. 
Essential (but not the only) aspect of social interactions is language. Few issues 
about language in the context of universal agents were considered, including impor-
tance of the two-part coding [22] that allows agents to efficiently communicate regu-
lar parts of models separated from noise. However, many other issues (such as symbol 
grounding) are still waiting to be thoroughly considered in this context. 
One additional significant aspect of multi-agent interactions is that the environment 
appears to be much more complex and computationally powerful than the agent. This 
aspect is not a heuristic or prior, but it should be considered in the basic IMI models. 
4 Conclusions 
Cognitive functions can be properly designed as an inductive bias and search heuris-
tics necessary for the universal algorithmic intelligence to become efficient pragmatic 
general intelligence (acting in the specific real-world environment using limited re-
sources and relatively short learning time). 
Some cognitive functions have already been suchwise represented separately in 
different papers. Mathematical descriptions extending the models of the universal 
algorithmic intelligence have also been given for some of them. We believe that the 
way to AGI lies through systematic investigations in this direction, which are still 
almost absent. In this paper, a step towards it is taken. 
All cognitive functions should be considered and described jointly, because they 
are interconnected. However, these functions consist of separable metaheuristics, 
which mathematical models can be introduced consequently. All heuristics and priors 
depend on the environment properties, but some of them are tightly connected to the 
task being solved by the intelligent agent. Decomposition of the prediction, decision 
making, and self-optimization tasks relies on such primary metaheuristics, which 
define general structure of memory and knowledge representations. Finer details of 
this structure greatly depend on the bias conditioned by the real-world environment. 
In particular, specific sensorimotor representations and social priors constitute this 
bias. 
Recent results of different authors on formalization of cognitive functions within 
the framework of the universal algorithmic intelligence encourage, and the program 
of systematically introducing the grounded cognitive bias seems to be feasible. 
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